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Abstract
Michael Devitt’s views on realism and naturalism have a lot in
common with those of W.V. Quine. Both appear to be realists;
both accept naturalized epistemology and abandon the old goal
of first philosophy; both view philosophy as continuous with the
empirical procedures of science and hence view metaphysics as
similarly empirical; and both seem to view realism as following
from naturalism. Although Quine and Devitt share quite a bit
ideologically, I think there is a deeper, more fundamental dissimi-
larity between the two. I will explore the difference between them
in an attempt to bring out the subtle complexities surrounding
the issue of realism–complexities, I will argue, Devitt sometimes
overlooks. I will also explore a real tension in Quine between his
earlier, more pragmatic (or anti-realist) tendencies and his later,
more austere realism. I will conclude by defending a more Quinean
brand of realism I call internal realism.
1 Introduction
Michael Devitt is one of the leading defenders of the metaphysical po-
sition of realism [4, 5, 8]. According to Devitt, “the defense of realism
depends on distinguishing it from other doctrines and on choosing the
right place to start the argument” [8, p. 90]. Devitt’s starting point is
made apparent by the five maxims he lays out at the beginning of [4],
and which form the basis of his defense of realism. They are:
Maxim 1 In considering realism, distinguish the constitutive and evi-
dential issues.
Maxim 2 Distinguish the metaphysical (ontological) issue of realism
from any semantic issue.
Maxim 3 Settle the realism issue before any epistemic or semantic is-
sue.
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Maxim 4 In considering the semantic issue, don’t take truth for granted.
Maxim 5 Distinguish the issue of correspondence truth from any epis-
temic issue.
Devitt’s defense of these maxims, and the starting point they dictate,
is largely based on his arguments for, and his acceptance of, naturalism—
“the view that there is only one way of knowing, the empirical way that
is the basis of science” [8, p. 96].
Devitt argues that we should give up the old a priori attempts at
settling the metaphysical issue of realism, attempts that start from either
an a priori epistemology or an a priori semantics, for such attempts
are hopeless. Instead, we should embrace an empirical (or naturalized)
metaphysics and work in the opposite direction. If we start with an
empirical metaphysics, the contention is that we’ll end up in a much
better place—namely, with an empirical or naturalized epistemology1
and an empirical semantics.2 In addition, according to Devitt, “when
we approach our metaphysics empirically, Realism is irresistible” [8, p.
96].3
Devitt’s views on naturalism and realism have a lot in common with
those of W.V. Quine—at least they appear to on the surface. Both accept
naturalized epistemology and abandon the old goal of first philosophy;
both view philosophy as continuous with the empirical procedures of sci-
ence and hence view metaphysics as similarly empirical; both reject the
possibility of a priori knowledge (see [11, ch.2]; and [6, 7]; both appear
to be realists;4 and both seem to view realism as following from natural-
ism. Devitt, for example, believes that once we approach metaphysics
naturalistically “realism is irresistible.” And Quine believes that once
we go naturalistic our scientific theories and common-sense beliefs about
1Epistemology itself becomes part of science and is “naturalized” in Quine’s sense.
See Quine’s “Epistemology Naturalized” [13, ch.3].
2In this paper I will be more concerned with the first claim, that of naturalized
epistemology. Devitt, however, goes to great lengths in [6] to apply a naturalistic
methodology to semantics, and to defend an anti-holistic truth-referential view of
meaning. Although Devitt’s views on meaning and reference are drastically different
from those of Quine’s, this is not the issue I wish to discuss here. I am here concerned
only with the issue of realism. I will discuss semantics, if at all, only in connection
with this issue.
3The capital R in “Realism” is to indicate Devitt’s own formulation of the realism
thesis, which I will explicate in Section I of this paper.
4I say “appear” because there is a real tension in Quine between his later, more
realist writings, and his earlier, more pragmatic (or anti-realist) writings. This is one
of the issues I will be exploring throughout the paper.
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reality can serve as the fabric of Neurath’s boat. According to Quine,
“There is nothing we can be more certain of than external things—some
of them, anyway—other people, sticks and stones” [17, p. 1-2].
Although there are these similarities between Quine and Devitt, I
think there is a deeper, more fundamental dissimilarity between the two.
In particular, Quine does not think that the realism issue could be settled
independently of all epistemic and semantic issues—at least it’s not clear
that he does. For Quine, these issues are all a jumbled mess. In addition,
it’s unclear whether Quine’s acceptance of naturalism leads him directly
to realism, or at least the brand of realism Devitt advocates. There is a
real tension in Quine between his earlier, more pragmatic or anti-realist
tendencies, and his later, more austere realism. In [11], for example,
Quine suggests that the question of realism, understood in the language
and mind independent way that Devitt defines it, may be spurious:
“Certainly we are in a predicament if we try to answer the
question; for to answer the question we must talk about the
world as well as about language, and to talk about the world
we must already impose upon the world some conceptual
scheme peculiar to our own special language” [11, p. 78].
This talk of the imposition of conceptual schemes onto the world would
seem to make Quine an anti-realist on Devitt’s criteria.5 For Quine,
what conceptual scheme we accept, and hence what ontology we accept,
is often viewed as a pragmatic issue. Devitt, on the other hand, would
want to argue that what exists is independent of all such issues and is
instead an objective matter.
One of the things I would like to do in this paper is examine the
tension in Quine between his realist and anti-realist tendencies. And I
would like to do this not simply as a scholastic or historical exercise, but
as a way of bringing out the subtle complexities surrounding the issue
of realism; complexities, I feel, Devitt sometimes overlooks. I will argue
that Devitt’s maxims are incapable of establishing the brand of realism
he desires. I will instead develop and defend a more Quinean brand of
realism—one similar to Devitt’s, but which he would most likely not
acknowledge as his own (and perhaps not even acknowledge as a form of
realism). The position I wish to defend is what I call internal realism.
5For Devitt’s criteria see Section I of this paper.
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I. Devitt’s Account of Realism
According to Devitt, the metaphysical doctrine of realism has two di-
mensions: an existence dimension and an independence dimension [4,
2.2 and 2.3]. The existence dimension commits the realist to the exis-
tence of such common-sense entities as stones, trees, and cats, and such
scientific entities as electrons, muons, and curved spacetime. This ex-
istence dimension is not enough to define realism, according to Devitt,
since anti-realists can also accept it.
“Typically, idealists, the traditional opponents of realists,
have not denied this dimension; or, at least, have not straight-
forwardly denied it. What they have denied is the indepen-
dence dimension” [8, p. 91].
On some idealist accounts, the more traditional ones, the entities iden-
tified by the existence dimension are made up of mental items—ideas or
sense data—and are therefore not external to the mind. And in more
recent times another sort of idealism has become common.
“According to these idealists, the entities are not in a certain
respect ‘objective’: they depend for their existence and na-
ture on the cognitive activities and capacities of our minds”
[5, p. 44].
Devitt’s account of realism rejects all such mind dependencies.
For Devitt, statements of the independence dimension of realism in-
clude such key terms as “external” and “objective.” To say that an
object has “objective existence,” on Devitt’s account, is to say
“that it is not constituted by our knowledge, by our epistemic
values, by our capacities to refer to it, by the synthesizing
power of the mind, by our imposition of concepts, theories,
or language” [4, p. 15].
And Devitt is quick to point out that many worlds lack this sort of
objectivity: Kant’s phenomenal world, Dummett’s verifiable world, the
stars made by a Goodman version, the constructed world of Putnam’s
internal realism, Kuhn’s world of theoretical ontologies, and the many
worlds created by the discourses of structuralists and post-structuralists
[4]. As we will see in Sections II and III, Devitt may also want to add
Quine to this list.
In addition to objective existence, the independence dimension re-
quires that the material and physical world exist not only objectively but
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also non-mentally. “At the insignificant risk of overkill,” says Devitt, “it
seems best to talk of both objectivity and independence in characteriz-
ing realism” [4, p. 16]. Simply put, the world must exist independently
of the mental.6 The joint claims of mind-independence and objective
existence comprise the second dimension of realism—the independence
dimension.
The two dimensions of existence and independence, then, sufficiently
define Devitt’s use of “realism.” Neither dimension on its own will do.
The existence dimension without the independence dimension leads to
various forms of idealism. And the independence dimension without
the existence dimension leads to what Devitt calls Weak, or Fig-Leaf
Realism: a commitment merely to there being something independent
of us without specifying its nature [4, p. 23]. For Devitt, this doctrine is
so weak as to be uninteresting, but he believes it’s worth stating because
many so-called realists are committed to nothing more than this Fig-Leaf
Realism.
For Devitt, the minimal realist doctrine worth fighting for, and one
that preserves the above two dimensions, is captured by the following
doctrine:
Realism Tokens of most current common-sense and scientific physical
types objectively exist independently of the mental [4, p. 23].7
From now on I will use the term Realism (with a capital R) to refer to
this doctrine of Devitt’s so as to distinguish it from any other notion one
may have. Realism pretty much takes for granted both the ontology of
science and common sense, and the folk epistemological view that this
ontology is objective and independent. As Devitt puts it: “Science and
common sense are not, for the most part, to be ‘reinterpreted”’ [5, p.
45]. It is not just that our experiences are as if there are cats; there are
cats. It is not just that the observable world is as if there are atoms;
there are atoms. Devitt also believes the same goes for the unobservable
world posited by science.
To capture the distinction between realism concerning the observable
world and realism concerning the unobservable world, Devitt further
6This mind-independence claim amounts to the following: (1) the world does not
consist in mental objects of experience, either in ideas, as idealists like Berkeley
thought, or in sense data, as many phenomenalists thought; and (2) the world is
not made up of minds, as Leibniz thought, or something ultimately spiritual, as the
absolute idealists thought [4, p. 15-16].
7Although this statement of the Realism doctrine quantifies over types, Devitt
insists that it is only a convenience [4, 2.3 and 2.4].
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divides Realism into two separate doctrines. The first doctrine, which
deals with observables, he calls Common-Sense Realism (even though
some of the entities it is committed to are not common-sense ones). The
doctrine that deals with unobservables he calls Scientific Realism.
Common-Sense Realism Tokens of most current observable common-
sense and scientific physical types objectively exist independently
of the mental.
Scientific Realism Tokens of most current unobservable scientific phys-
ical types objectively exist independently of the mental [4, p. 24].
Although some philosophers accept Common-Sense Realism but deny
Scientific Realism, Devitt defends both. For the sake of convenience, I
will refer to the combination of these two doctrines simply as Realism,
distinguishing them only when the observable/unobservable distinction
is at issue.
Central to Devitt’s arguments for Realism is the claim that these
metaphysical doctrines can and must be disentangled from all epistemic
and semantic issues. As his third Maxim dictates, we are to settle the
realism issue before any epistemic or semantic issue. It’s Devitt’s insis-
tence that
“Realism says nothing semantic at all beyond, in its use of
‘objective’, making the negative point that our semantic ca-
pacities do not constitute the world” [4, p. 39, Devitt’s em-
phasis].
Similarly, Realism says nothing epistemic beyond the claim that the
independence dimension denies that the world is dependent for its exis-
tence and nature on what we believe. Realism is simply a metaphysical
doctrine for Devitt, and should therefore be separated out and settled
independently of all other issues. The question, however, is whether or
not this can be done.
Devitt, recall, wants to argue for something stronger than mere Fig-
Leaf Realism; he wants to argue that tokens of most common-sense and
scientific physical types (both observable and unobservable) objectively
exist independently of the mental. To do this he must specify what
these types are, or at least what many or most of them are. And it’s
unclear how he can do this without involving himself in disputes over
what conceptual scheme to apply—an issue that is usually relative to
pragmatic and epistemic concerns. As we will now see when we turn to
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Quine, what ontology we accept is almost always relative to what one’s
interests are.
II. Quine and Pragmatism
To understand Quine’s position on realism it’s useful to put the discus-
sion into some kind of context. A good place to start is with Quine’s
rejection of Carnap’s contrast between internal and external questions
[2].8 Carnap’s distinction was a powerful philosophical tool, and it’s easy
to understand Carnap’s resistance to its elimination. For one, it provided
a plausible diagnosis of the errors of traditional philosophers and a means
of overcoming them. When philosophers debate over whether there are
physical objects or universals, for example, Carnap’s diagnosis was that
they employ the material mode to talk about what is more perspicu-
ously expressed in the formal mode as issues about linguistic expressions.
What is really at issue is whether to adopt a certain linguistic frame-
work. Take the existence of universals. According to Carnap: “Are there
universals?” is better expressed, “Should we adopt a linguistic frame-
work which employs ‘x is a universal’ as one of its fundamental general
terms?” Talk of universals is covertly talk of language. The same is true
of physical objects.
Metaphysics, for Carnap, grows out of the error of viewing issues
which, when correctly formulated in the metalinguistic formal mode,
can be seen not to be substantive. And since adoption of frameworks
8In [2], Carnap recognizes two sorts of questions concerning the existence or re-
ality of entities: internal and external questions. According to Carnap, discussing
a new kind of entity requires the construction of a linguistic framework. A linguis-
tic framework is a way of organizing human communication about particular sets of
experiences and observations—it is a set of rules governing the way in which these
entities are described and referenced. For Carnap, an internal question is a ques-
tion asked and answered within the linguistic framework. External questions, on the
other hand, are asked of the larger system within which the entities are supposed to
exist—that is, external questions concern the existence or reality of the framework
itself. One of Carnap’s examples concerns what he calls “the thing world,” which
he defines as “the spatio-temporally ordered system of observable things and events”
[2, p. 210]. Internal questions regarding the thing world would include: Is there a
white piece of paper on my desk? Are unicorns real or merely imaginary? What
kinds of quarks are protons made of? Such questions, Carnap maintains, must be
distinguished from the external question of the reality of the thing world itself. Car-
nap, being a logical positivist, believed that such external metaphysical questions
were ultimately unverifiable and therefore meaningless [1, 2, 3]. For Carnap, which
linguistic framework(s) we accept is a pragmatic issue concerning the utility of the
framework concerned. Quine rejects Carnap’s internal/external distinction largely on
the grounds that it parallels the ill-fated analytic/synthetic distinction [11, 12]
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turns on pragmatic convenience rather than correspondence to reality,
philosophers delude themselves when they believe they are involved in a
substantive debate.
A further advantage of retaining the distinction between internal and
external questions surfaces when we consider the relation between prag-
matism and objectivity. Our taking a realist attitude towards a subject
matter, our seeing it as objective, involves believing that the correct an-
swer to questions arising about it are not up to us. The force of this
observation is nicely captured by Carnap’s distinction. When I attempt
to answer an internal question from within the perspective of a particular
framework, it is not up to me what answer I should give. The rules of the
framework, in light of experience, determine some answer as the correct
one. However, when the question “Are there physical objects?” is raised
as an external question, this form of objectivity is missing. The correct
answer will reflect the tastes, interests, and standards of simplicity of the
person who asks it. For Carnap, choice of framework reflects subjective
interests and purposes, not correspondence to an objective independent
reality.
Carnap’s distinction, then, enables us to disentangle the subjective
and objective elements in the growth of knowledge. For example, the
objectivity of science can be acknowledged and explained in terms of
the character of internal questions. But if, on the other hand, we fol-
low Quine in abandoning this distinction, a number of problems seem to
arise. Once the situation is muddied by the recognition that pragmatic
considerations may have a role in answering even internal questions, then
it is difficult to sustain the claim that the theoretical parts of science are
genuinely objective. We need to determine how Quine disentangles the
subjective and objective elements in our knowledge. Are all questions
analogous to internal ones for Quine, or are they analogous to external
ones? And if neither analogy is appropriate, assuming subjective prag-
matic criteria are invoked when we revise our opinions, can room be
found for saying that we investigate an objective reality? These are the
questions to which I now turn.
In “Two Dogmas” [11, ch. 2], Quine notes two effects of abandoning
the analytic/synthetic distinction. The first is “a blurring of the sup-
posed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science”
and the other is a “shift toward pragmatism” [11, p. 20]. I will discuss
the first of these effects in the next section, but for the moment I would
like to focus on the shift toward pragmatism. In the closing sections of
both “Two Dogmas” and “On What There Is” [11, ch. 1 & 2], Quine
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gives numerous endorsements of pragmatism. It may first appear, then,
that pragmatic considerations become relevant to all questions once the
contrast between external and internal is abandoned. Curiously, though,
the references to pragmatism vanish from Quine’s later writings. As to
whether this represents a substantive shift in Quine’s thinking is an issue
I will address a little later on. For the moment, I would like to focus on
the possibility that Quine’s pragmatism requires that all questions have
the status of Carnap’s external questions. If this were the case, realism
would go by the board for all objectivity would be lost. Could this have
been what Quine wanted?
Well, many passages in [11] seem to support just such a reading. In
“Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis” [11, ch. 4], for example, Quine
refers to Duhem and asserts that it is meaningless to “inquire into the
absolute correctness of a conceptual scheme as a mirror of reality” [11,
p. 79]. He goes on to say:
“Our standard for appraising basic changes of conceptual
scheme must be, not a realist standard of correspondence
to reality, but a pragmatic standard. Concepts are language,
and the purpose of concepts and of language is efficacy in
communication and prediction. Such is the ultimate duty of
language, science and philosophy, and it is in relation to that
duty that a conceptual scheme has finally to be appraised”
[11, p. 79].
And again, in “On What There Is” [11, ch. 1], after admitting that
choice of ontology like choice of scientific theory rests upon pragmatic
considerations of overall simplicity and coherence, Quine appears to ad-
vocate a tolerant pragmatic pluralism or relativism.
Our acceptance of an ontology is, according to Quine,
“similar in principle to our acceptance of a scientific theory,
say a system of physics: we adopt, at least insofar as we
are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which
the disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and
arranged” [11, p. 16].
Our ontology is determined once we have fixed upon the overall concep-
tual scheme that is to accommodate science in the broadest sense. Not-
ing, however, that simplicity is not a clear and unambiguous idea, Quine
contrasts two conceptual schemes for coping with experience. One, a
phenomenalistic scheme, talks only of sense experience and their prop-
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erties; the other, a physicalist scheme, deals with ordinary physical ob-
jects.
“Which should prevail? Each has its advantages; each has its
special simplicity in its own way. Each, I suggest, deserves
to be developed. Each may be said, indeed, to be the more
fundamental, though in different senses: the one is epistemo-
logically, the other physically, fundamental” [11, p. 17].
From the point of view of the phenomenalistic scheme, and from Quine’s
own empiricist outlook, physical objects are imported to make coherent
sense of our experience as “irreducible posits comparable, epistemologi-
cally, to the gods of Homer” [11, p. 44].
“For my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical ob-
jects and not in the gods of Homer; and I consider it a sci-
entific error to do otherwise. But in point of epistemological
footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree
and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conceptions
only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects is epis-
temologically superior to most in that it has proven more
efficacious than other myths as a device for working a man-
ageable structure into the flux of experience” [11, p. 44].
It is easy to take away from this the picture that all inquiry is a more or
less useful kind of myth making. On this anti-realist reading of Quine,
there is no sense in which one or another of the myths is objectively
true; we can approach our experience without seeing any one of them as
fundamental.
Is this how we should read Quine? Nelson Goodman [9, 10], a figure
close to Quine in many ways, has developed a view similar to the one
under consideration. In [10], Goodman explicitly defends an anti-realist
pluralism or relativism. He contrasts many different “versions” of the
world that we construct—those of science, of common sense, of literature,
music, and other arts—and deplores the view that some one of these is
closer to reality or more perspicuous as a representation of it than the
other. For Goodman, there is not one true account of reality, but as
many versions of it as we construct and find to be fruitful. Could this be
what Quine wanted? I think the answer is no. In a review of Goodman’s
book, Quine rejects this tolerant pluralism [17, ch. 11]. And in his later
writings, Quine increasingly describes himself as a realist and turns to
the physical sciences for a description of reality.
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What we need is a reading of Quine that makes him less offensive to
Devitt’s Realism, but which, at the same time, does justice to these ear-
lier insights. The reading I will suggest, and the position I wish to defend,
is a form of internal realism: a realism that captures the intuition that
most common-sense and scientific existence statements are objectively
true, but claims that this objectivity arises only from within a particu-
lar language, theory, or conceptual scheme.9 The objectivity will arise
because, “judged [from] within some particular conceptual scheme...an
ontological statement goes without saying, standing in need of no sepa-
rate justification at all” [11, p. 10]. As for why the conceptual scheme
should be a realist one, this will be discussed in the following section.
Although this internal realism will preserve more objectivity than Good-
man’s versions, it will not fulfill the demands of Devitt’s maxims. For
if Quine is correct, when we set out to answer the question of realism
“we must talk about the world as well as about language, and to talk
about the world we must already impose upon the world some concep-
tual scheme peculiar to our own special language” [11, p. 78]. It can
only be internal to such a conceptual scheme that realism makes sense,
for “we cannot detach ourselves from it and compare it objectively with
an unconceptualized reality” [11, p. 79]. Devitt overlooks the important
role that conceptual scheme and language play in settling the ontological
issue, and his maxims therefore reflect an untenable dualism between the
two.
III. Quine’s Realism and Naturalism
We just saw how Quine adopts a pragmatic standard for appraising basic
changes of conceptual scheme, and we were afraid that this would lead to
a loss of objectivity—i.e., we feared that Quine’s pragmatism essentially
involved turning every question into an external one. I think this is the
wrong way to approach Quine. As we will now see, I think it is less
misleading to say that he turns every question into an internal one. For
Quine, our views of what exists evolve with the language we speak. And
since our ontology is internal to the language we speak, and we can never
9I am here using the term objective in a different sense than Devitt. Objectivity,
for Devitt, recall, means “that it is not constituted by our knowledge, by our epistemic
values, by our capacities to refer to it, by the synthesizing power of the mind, by our
imposition of concepts, theories, or language” [4, p. 15]. Part of what I’m arguing
is that this is not a good definition of objectivity, for the issue of realism can never
be separated out from all these other issues. My use of objectivity should become
clearer in what follows.
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step outside language altogether, we can only appraise our ontology in
a piece-meal way.
The anti-realist reading of Quine considered in the previous section
results from ignoring important continuities between philosophy and the
rest of our knowledge; continuities that are required by the holism Quine
urges in [11] and elsewhere. It also ignores Quine’s naturalism and em-
piricism. As I will now argue, the naturalistic philosopher is justified
in taking for granted his everyday view of the world when he considers
questions about knowledge, meaning, and ontology. And although this
will bring with it a certain amount of objectivity, there will always be
room for adjustments. These adjustments can still be made on pragmatic
grounds; it’s just that the pragmatic standards must be applied internal
to the conceptual scheme one occupies, and they must be answerable to
experience.
It is time, then, to introduce what Quine calls the fifth and fi-
nal milestone of empiricism: the milestone of naturalism [17, p. 72].
Quine’s naturalized epistemology abandons the old goal of first philos-
ophy and instead views epistemology as an enterprise within natural
science. Attempts at transcendent doubt, or transcendent justification,
are no longer seen as worthy pursuits. The philosopher and the scientist
are in the same boat according to Quine, and “unlike the old episte-
mologists, we seek no firmer basis for science than science itself” [18,
p. 16]. The futility of trying to doubt everything all at once, or trying
to achieve an external position, is replaced by the analogy of Neurath’s
mariner who “has to rebuild his boat while staying afloat in it” [13, p.
84].
According to the new naturalistic approach, epistemology “simply
falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science”
[13, p. 82]. It views the human subject as a natural phenomenon, and
uses empirical science to study epistemic activity. Epistemology, in its
new setting, is seen as a scientific study of how the human subject takes
sensory stimulation as inputs and delivers as output a theory of the
three-dimensional world.
In our attempt to answer the central epistemological question, viz.,
how did we acquire such a responsible theory of the external world, Quine
believes we are free to use the fruits of science to investigate its roots.
In a nice summary of the position, Quine writes:
“Cartesian doubt is not the way to begin. Retaining our
present beliefs about nature, we can still ask how we arrived
at them. Science tells us that our only source of informa-
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tion about the external world is through the impact of light
rays and molecules upon our sensory surfaces. Stimulated
in this way, we somehow evolve an elaborate and useful sci-
ence. How do we do this, and why does the resulting science
work so well? These are genuine questions, and no feigning
of doubt is needed to appreciate them. They are scientific
questions about a species of primates, and they are open to
investigation in natural science, the very science whose ac-
quisition is being investigated” [15, p. 68].
This use of science to investigate its own acquisition and success is a
radical break from traditional epistemology, for it abandons the quest
for a nonscientific justification of our knowledge of the external world.
How, then, does naturalism relate to the issue of realism? Well, we
can now say that it is our scientific theories and common-sense beliefs
about reality that serve as the fabric of Neurath’s boat, and which allow
it to stay afloat when threatened by philosophical perplexities. Once
naturalism is embraced there remains no reason to doubt such beliefs and
it seems natural that realism should follow. The naturalistic philosopher
works from within a realist worldview since it’s the one that science
dictates. As Devitt puts it:
“Naturalized epistemology takes science, and hence its posits
pretty much for granted. And an obvious starting assump-
tion is the aforementioned one that these posits exist objec-
tively and independently of the mental. So it approaches
epistemology from a Realist standpoint; it is in accord with
Maxim 3” [4, p. 76].
Quine appears to agree with Devitt about the relationship between nat-
uralism and realism. He points out, for example, that naturalism reflects
an “unregenerate realism” [17, p. 72]. And he adds:
“The naturalistic philosopher begins his reasoning within the
inherited world theory as a going concern. He tentatively
believes all of it, but believes also that some unidentified
portions are wrong. He tries to improve, clarify, and under-
stand the system from within. He is a busy sailor adrift on
Neurath’s boat” [17, p. 72].
Both seem to agree that in accepting naturalism we have no choice but
to continue to take seriously our own particular world-theory, or loose
total fabric of quasi-theories. But what does it mean to “take seriously”
Gregg Caruso: Realism, Naturalism, and Pragmatism 77
our current theories, and does that lead to the brand of Realism that
Devitt desires?
Perhaps it simply means that we should take science seriously since
it’s the only game in town. But in that case, what does science itself
tell us about scientific activity? We learn in Quine that our only source
of information about the external world is through the impact of light
rays and molecules upon our sensory surfaces. From a practical point of
view, its utility lies in fulfilling expectation and true prediction:
“Our talk of external things, our very notion of things, is just
a conceptual apparatus that helps us to foresee and control
the triggering of our sensor receptors in the light of previous
triggering of our sensory receptors. The triggering, first and
last, is all we have to go on” [17, p. 1].
Quine denies that these remarks have any skeptical content, for the pas-
sage is itself about external things—people and nerve endings. And
for Quine, “There is nothing we can be more certain of than external
things—some of them anyway—other people, sticks and stones” [17, p.
1-2]. But he goes on to add, “there remains the fact—a fact of science
itself—that science is a conceptual bridge linking sensory stimulation to
sensory stimulation” [17, p. 2].
Although Quine embraces an almost unrepenting physicalism in his
later writings, it would seem that his theory here does not support such
an austere position. If science teaches us that science is nothing but a
conceptual bridge, valued because we are enabled to anticipate the future
course of experience, doesn’t science itself undermine its claim to give
us a “true” account of physical reality? If different theories, offering
alternative accounts of the underlying nature of matter, were equally
effective in enabling us to avoid perceptual surprise, what sense attaches
to the claim that one is true and the other false? It appears that the
pragmatist claims of Section II have not been left behind.
Devitt considers such an objection [4, 5.9] but dismisses it quickly.
He concludes that “Realism alone explains ‘the regularities in our expe-
riences’ ” [4, p. 80]. This may simply be, however, a lack of imagination
on Devitt’s part. What reason, except for some a priori one, do we
have for thinking that no alternative to our current conceptual scheme
could be equally successful in communication and prediction? I believe
that Devitt, and Quine himself at times, downplay without cause the
important pragmatic features of [11].
In his later writings in particular, Quine seems hell-bent on defending
physicalism. I imagine it’s because he believes that our best theorizing
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will lead to a physicalistic conceptual scheme:
“A physicalistic conceptual scheme, purporting to talk about
external objects, offers great advantages in simplifying our
over-all reports. By bringing together scattered sense events
and treating them as perceptions of one object, we reduce
the complexity of our stream of experience to a manageable
conceptual simplicity” [11, p. 17].
I think someone could agree with Quine that philosophy should fall into
place as a part of science, while rejecting Quine’s own “scientific” view of
reality. Quine is a physicalist, and he sometimes claims that the physical
facts are all the facts. It is physics that describes the nature of reality,
and sciences other than physics are treated with some suspicion.10 In a
review of J.J.C. Smart, Quine endorses the claim that “the physicist’s
language gives us a truer picture of the world than does the language
of common sense” [17, p. 92-93]. This I find unwarranted. The retreat
from Carnap’s external perspective to Neurath’s boat does not offer any
obvious basis for adopting this austere conception of the structure of
reality.
Let me contrast two ways in which Neurath’s boat metaphor could
be developed. According to the first (version A), we start with a vast,
somewhat disorganized structure comprising all of our common-sense
beliefs and prejudices, together with scientific beliefs drawn from all the
different disciplines. As a result of scientific inquiries, this corpus of
opinions grows and evolves: new opinions are added, old ones are jetti-
soned, and others are reformulated or revised in other ways. This is the
most natural reading of the doctrine. My remarks about Quine’s phys-
icalism, however, might suggest an alternative interpretation (version
B). Since only physics describes the facts, all that the boat metaphor is
supposed to represent is the development of physical theory. Common-
sense assurances, theories from chemistry, biology, economics, historical
descriptions, would then have no place in the boat. If this second version
is required by Quine’s physicalism, it is hard to see why it is preferable
to the first.
In addition, I need not settle this issue at all to make the point I
wish to make. Since science is a linguistic structure that is keyed to
observation only at points, our talk of the external world is “just a
10Quine’s psychology, for example, is heavily behavioristic and physiological, having
little room for the patterns of explanation used in common-sense discussions of the
mind and action. Quine’s physicalism is the principle source of the distinctive flavor
of his philosophical position.
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conceptual apparatus that helps us to foresee and control the triggering
of our sensory receptors in the light of previous triggering of our sensory
receptors” [17, p. 1]. Once this is acknowledged, it will be realized that
Neurath’s boat is a conceptual one, making contact with some external
reality from time to time, but creating its own reality while out at sea!
We can always fight over which theory (or set of theories) should be
accepted based on pragmatic and epistemic grounds, but it’s meaningless
to inquire into the absolute correctness of a conceptual scheme as a
mirror of reality for “we cannot detach ourselves from it and compare it
objectively with an unconceptualized reality” [11, p. 79].
This brings us to an important point. The naturalistic picture that
has developed makes use of two different conceptions of reality. One is
differentiated into objects and is relative to the language that differenti-
ates it, and the other one is undifferentiated. This latter is reminiscent
of Kant. It is what produces in us the disordered fragments of raw expe-
rience, the scattered sense events. Although in “Two Dogmas” [11, ch.
2] Quine denies that we are conscious of any raw data, his naturalized
epistemology retains a similar dualism ([12, ch. 1]; [13, ch. 3]). Our
knowledge of the external world is mediated through “stimulations” at
the surfaces of our perceptual organs, and our framework of sentences is
tied down to reality only insofar as it enables us to anticipate these stim-
ulations. These stimulations receive conceptual interpretation through
our activity of inquiry: “we adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable,
the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments or
raw experience can be fitted or arranged” [11, p. 16]. For Kant, the
ordering in question is transcendental. For Quine, who rejects Kant’s
distinctions,11 all ordering is a matter of theorizing.
A serious problem arises here for Devitt’s formulation of the Realism
doctrine. We can even say that a paradox threatens: Devitt is unable
to make use of either of the two notions of reality that naturalism rec-
ognizes. The undifferentiated notion is no good because, at best, it can
only secure a brand of Fig-Leaf Realism. And the differentiated notion
of reality does not possess the mind-independence and objectivity that
Devitt desires; it is conceptual through-and-through. If science is just a
linguistic and conceptual structure that is keyed to observation at some
points, how can we take its posits as having objective existence—an exis-
tence “that is not constituted by our knowledge, by our epistemic values,
by our capacities to refer to it, by the synthesizing power of the mind, by
11Quine denies the distinction between the transcendental, a priori, and necessary
on the one side, and the empirical, a posteriori, and contingent on the other.
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our imposition of concepts, theories, or language” [4, p. 15]? It appears
that Devitt is left with only one option: to embrace internal realism.
IV. Internal Realism
According to internal realism, the differentiated reality that naturalism
recognizes lacks “objective existence” (as defined by Devitt), for it is
constituted by our imposition of concepts, theories, and language. In
fact, science itself teaches us that it is so constituted! Internal realism,
however, still maintains its own brand of objectivity. It’s the kind that
comes along with being internal to a conceptual scheme. Just what is
involved in treating an area of discourse as objective? What does it mean
to view a conceptual scheme, language, or theory as describing a facet
of reality? According to internal realism, it simply means taking one’s
conceptual scheme seriously and owning the beliefs of the moment. It has
nothing to do with correspondence to some “external” or “independent”
reality.12
Suppose that according to my current theory (or as part of my total
fabric of quasi-theories), protons have positive charge. This will mani-
fest itself in several ways: in the explanations I accept, in the inferences
I draw, and the assertions I make. Among these assertions will be the
assertion that protons carry positive charge. My taking this as “ob-
jective,” or as describing a facet of reality, consists in the fact that I
say, “Protons carry positive charge.” Relativity to theory is not explicit
or implicit in my speech act; I simply treat it as assertible. The fact
that it is assertible serves as a kind of fixed point for philosophical and
scientific reflection. Internal realism therefore claims that our scientific
and common-sense views of the world provide us with our substantive
conception of reality—that which we take to be objective.
Internal realism follows Quine in rejecting the Carnapian framework.
And part of that rejection is the denial that we can step back and take
up a transcendental view of our knowledge. This “realism” reflects the
view that our cognitive position is always internal to a body of substan-
tive theory: “Whatever we affirm, after all, we affirm as a statement
12Internal realism denies, as do Quine and Devitt, that the issue of realism can be
formulated in terms of a correspondence notion of truth (or any other substantive
notion). Quine, for example, embraces a purely deflationary or disquotational notion
of truth (e.g., [14]). And Devitt argues that the correspondence theory of truth is in
no way constitutive of his doctrine of Realism [4, 8]. Devitt maintains that Realism
does not entail the correspondence theory, and the correspondence theory does not
entail Realism.
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within our aggregate theory of nature as we now see it; and to call a
statement true is just to reaffirm it” [16, p. 327]. But internal realism
also acknowledges that our “aggregate theory of nature” has a certain
amount of relativity to it. And this need not be in conflict with natural-
ism. For naturalism itself tell us that our knowledge of external objects
is mediated through sensations or experiences (or stimulations), which
receive conceptual interpretation through our activities of inquiry. It
acknowledges a dualism of data and interpretation.
Now it’s possible that Devitt would be open to such a position. In
fact, he may even argue that his doctrine of Realism says nothing more
than my Quinean brand of internal realism. If that were the case, then
there would be nothing more than a verbal dispute between us as to what
we should call the position. I am skeptical, however, that Devitt would
agree with everything I’ve argued. For one, the differentiated reality
that constitutes what I’m calling internal realism has a certain amount
of relativity to it, and I’m not sure Devitt wants to acknowledge such
relativity. In addition, internal realism maintains that we can never step
outside our own conceptual scheme, language, or theory so as to settle
the realism issue. Although there may be a sense of reality that allows
us to secure a brand of Fig-Leaf Realism, the reality that matters most
to us is the one that’s constituted by our conceptual scheme. It is only
internal to a conceptual scheme that the issues of realism and objectivity
make any sense.
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